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Using a GARCH model, we study the effects of Canadian and U.S. central bank 
communication and macroeconomic news on Canadian bond, stock, and foreign exchange 
market returns and volatility. First, central bank communication and macro news from both 
countries have an impact on Canadian financial markets. Second, Canadian central bank 
communication is more relevant than its U.S. counterpart, whereas in the case of macro news, 
that originating from the United States dominates. Third, we find evidence that the impact of 
Canadian news reaches its maximum when the Canadian target rate departs from the Federal 
Funds target rate (2002–2004) and thereafter. The introduction of fixed announcement dates 
(FAD) initially does not cause a noticeable break in the data. Finally, Canadian and U.S. 
target rate changes lead to higher price volatility, and so does other U.S. news. Other 
Canadian news, however, lowers price volatility. 
 
JEL:   E52, G14, G15 
Keywords:    Bank of Canada, Central Bank Communication, Federal Reserve Bank, 
Financial Markets, Macroeconomic News, Monetary Policy 3 
1.  Introduction 
Canada, as a small open economy, depends to a large extent on global economic 
developments. Trade and capital flow linkages to its major trading partners, as well as the 
foreign interest rate level, are important for the Canadian economy. In our sample period, 
about two-thirds of total portfolio investments in Canada are made by U.S. investors. The 
trade share with the United States is also quite large (77 percent in 1998, 68 percent in 2006). 
In 95 percent of all currency transactions involving Canadian dollars, these are converted into 
U.S. dollars and vice versa.
1 These figures indicate that economic developments in the United 
States and its monetary policy should play a particularly important role in the development of 
the Canadian economy and its financial markets. There has even been discussion of creating a 
monetary union between Canada and the United States or unilaterally adopting a U.S. dollar 
peg. For instance, Buiter (1999) concludes that economic arguments favour a full, formally 
symmetric monetary union. 
Therefore, when studying Canadian financial markets, one needs to consider economic 
events occurring in the United States. Gravelle and Moessner (2001) state that throughout the 
1990s, Canadian market participants tended to put greater emphasis on U.S. macroeconomic 
data releases than on Canadian ones. Thus, one should expect U.S. macroeconomic news and 
monetary policy to have a significant impact on Canadian financial markets. In addition, it is 
important to study monetary policy communication in a broad sense, and not only target rate 
changes, as market participants also adjust to news conveyed in speeches and testimony by 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members. As U.S. financial markets react to 
informal channels of monetary policy (see, e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007; Hayo et al., 
2008), we expect Canadian markets will, too. 
Our sample period, 1998 to 2006, includes several formal and informal changes in 
Canadian monetary policy. Ever since September 1998, the Bank of Canada (BOC) has 
intervened in the foreign exchange market only under “exceptional circumstances.” In 
September 2000, it introduced fixed announcement dates (FAD); previously, target rate 
changes could effectively occur on any business day.
2 With the introduction of FADs, the 
BOC became more “independent” from the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed). The BOC does not 
explicitly refer to any prior decisions by the Fed in its post-meeting statements after May 
                                                            
1 Sources: IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, BIS Triennial 
Central Bank Survey (2007), and own calculations. 
2 The Bank of Canada had four key objectives when it introduced the new system for announcing target rate 
decisions: reduced uncertainty in financial markets, more emphasis on medium-term monetary policy, increased 
transparency regarding the BOC’s interest rate decisions, and greater focus on the Canadian rather than the U.S. 
economic environment (Parent et al., 2003). 4 
2000. For instance, between April 2002 and September 2004, the BOC target rate deviates 
substantially from the Federal Funds target rate (see Figure 1 in the Appendix). 
This is the first paper to study the effects of formal and informal communication by 
the BOC as well as by the Fed on Canadian financial markets using a novel set of data. In this 
paper, we address four research questions: 
1.  Does U.S. and Canadian central bank communication (including target rate changes) and 
macroeconomic news have an impact on Canadian financial market returns? 
2.  Which type of news, U.S. or Canadian, is relatively more relevant? 
3.  Does the introduction of the FAD system change agents’ sensitivity to Canadian news? In 
particular, is there a stronger reaction to Canadian news in the April 2002 to September 
2004 subsample, a period during which the course of BOC monetary policy was different 
from that of the Fed, compared to reactions in other periods? This is of particular interest 
as the BOC followed the U.S. interest rate path closely even after introduction of the FAD 
system. 
4.  Does U.S. and Canadian news exert an influence on financial market volatility? 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we summarise 
previous work in this area and outline the contributions of this paper. Section 3 describes the 
construction of the news dummies and explains our data set. Section 4 introduces the 
econometric methodology. Section 5 reports our empirical results for bond market returns; 
Section 6 focuses on stock and foreign exchange market returns. Section 7 presents the impact 
on financial market volatility. Some robustness checks and alternative specifications are 
discussed in Section 8. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2.  Related literature and our contribution 
Relevant studies in this strand of the literature typically assess the impact of U.S. or Canadian 
macroeconomic news or the influence of U.S. or Canadian target rate changes on financial 
markets in Canada, thereby neglecting (informal) central bank communication. The most 
closely related paper is by Gravelle and Moessner (2001) and covers the period January 1995 
to August 2000. The authors statistically quantify the adjustment of Canadian interest rates to 
macroeconomic news released in Canada and the United States and detect that the rates react 
very little to domestic shocks but are significantly affected by U.S. news. Moreover, they find 
little evidence that Canadian interest rates have become more sensitive to Canadian news over 
time. The authors hypothesise that the lack of FADs in Canada prior to December 2000 and 5 
the BOC’s efforts to smooth destabilising fluctuations in foreign exchange rates contribute to 
the difficulty of understanding monetary policy reactions in Canada. Parent (2003) extends 
the Gravelle and Moessner sample to September 2002. He concludes that under the FAD 
system, publication of Canadian data on short-term interest rates has an increased impact. In 
addition, the number of U.S. indicators having a significant impact on the interest rate has 
declined, though U.S. data are still important. 
Andreou (2005) and Kearns and Manners (2006) examine the impact of unexpected 
policy actions by the BOC on bond and foreign exchange markets, respectively. Surprise in 
target rate setting had a significant effect on bond market rates at the shorter end of the yield 
curve between August 1996 and May 2004, with the effect dissipating as maturity increased. 
In the period from October 1996 to June 2004, surprises causing a revision of future policy 
expectations have a larger impact on the exchange rate (1.69 percent per 100 bps) than 
surprises with respect to the timing of anticipated changes in policy (0.84 percent). Both 
findings imply that policy actions indicate only a change in timing of interest rate movements 
and do not signal a switch in the BOC’s longer-term policy goals. A second result from 
Andreou (2005) is that the impact on longer-term interest rates has diminished since the 
introduction of FADs. 
Bailey (1989) and Deaves (1991) document significant associations between weekly 
surprises in the announced level of U.S. M1 and unanticipated changes in the Canadian 
money supply as well as in Canadian financial markets during the periods of monetary 
targeting by the U.S. and Canada, respectively. In case of U.S. news, the Toronto stock index, 
bond prices, and short-term interest rates adjust after surprises, while the CAD/USD exchange 
rate is not affected. Canadian monetary news, in turn, significantly affects foreign exchange 
and bond markets. 
Beattie and Fillion (1999)
3 and Doukas and Switzer (2004)
4 examine the impact of 
macroeconomic news from both countries on intraday volatility of the CAD/USD exchange 
rate and Canadian dollar futures prices, respectively. Gradojevic and Neely (2008)
5 and Lucey 
et al. (2008)
6 assess the influence of U.S. macro surprises on joint dynamics of Canadian 
dollar order flows and the CAD/USD exchange rate and the returns and conditional volatility 
of Canadian stock returns, respectively. Of the Canadian variables, only target rate changes by 
                                                            
3 Sample length: April 1995–January 1998. 
4 Sample length: 1998–2001. 
5 Sample length: 1990–2004. 
6 Sample length: August 1999–August 2007. 6 
the BOC are shown to be consistently important, whereas in case of the United States, several 
variables can be identified: target rate changes by the FOMC, housing starts, PPI, and CPI. 
In this paper, we study the effects of all types of BOC and FOMC communication 
(including target rate movements) as well as Canadian and U.S. macroeconomic news on 
bond, stock, and foreign exchange market returns and volatility in Canada. The 
communication events are coded into dummy variables on the basis of their written content. 
We differentiate between news regarding monetary policy and that concerning economic 
outlook in our examination of post-meeting statements, monetary policy reports, speeches, 
and testimony. The macroeconomic news dummies are constructed from widely watched 
business cycle and price indicators. Our analysis focuses on immediate responses, i.e., the 
reaction on the day the news actually hits the respective market. 
Our sample period (1998–2006) is particularly well-suited to our purpose as it includes 
the above-mentioned change in Canadian monetary policy. Econometrically, we employ a 
GARCH specification of daily financial returns to capture the autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity that characterises many financial series. Our approach extends the existing 
literature in several ways. First, ours is a pioneering study of the effects of formal and 
informal communication by the BOC on Canadian financial markets. Previously, only actual 
target rate changes by the BOC have been studied. Second, we assess the hitherto neglected 
channel of communication by the Fed in this context. Third, we introduce a newly constructed 
data set on FOMC and BOC communications to the literature that is based on original 
sources, not just media reports. Fourth, this is the first study that examines the period of de 
facto different interest rate paths (2002–2004) between Canada and the United States. Fifth, 
we encompass many studies presented in the literature review, as we focus on a broad set of 
macroeconomic news and monetary policy from both countries. Previous work focuses either 
on news originating from one country—the United States or Canada—or employs only a 
small sample of macroeconomic news, thereby neglecting the informal channels of central 
bank communication. Sixth, we use this broad set of news to identify the most important 
categories of news from an economics perspective by incorporating the frequency of the 
announcements. Seventh, this paper provides the first application of a GARCH approach to 
Canadian financial market returns and volatility in the context of macroeconomic and 
monetary policy news. Finally, our inferences are derived within the context of a rigorous and 
consistent general-to-specific model-reduction process. 
  7 
3.  Data 
Our analysis takes advantage of a new data set introduced by Hayo et al. (2008), which 
includes indicator variables for 663 speeches and 151 congressional hearings, thereby 
covering all members of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors (BOG), as well as 68 
post-meeting statements and 20 monetary policy reports (MPR). Following the literature (see, 
e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007), we sort the communication content into either a 
“monetary policy” or “economic outlook” category. Coding for the U.S. economic outlook 
news is either “positive” (EO+) or “negative” (EO–), whereas “tightening” (MP+) or “easing” 
(MP–) are the categories for the Fed’s monetary policy stance. In the analysis, we employ 
separate dummy variables for positive and negative news to take into account possible 
asymmetric reactions of financial markets. In total, there are 16 communication dummies as 
all four types of communication (statements, MPR, testimony, speeches) can be coded into 
four different categories: EO+, EO–, MP+, or MP–. 
Extending the data set to Canada, we examine BOC communication, which is 
comprised of 61 post-meeting statements, 32 monetary policy reports, 5 testimonies, and 115 
speeches. We categorise the data in an analogous way; we checked the coding at two different 
points in time to ensure stability in our interpretation of the contents. The number of events is 
similar to the U.S. data for statements and monetary policy reports and, in fact, these ways of 
communicating with the public are organised similarly in both countries (see Table A1 for a 
more detailed comparison between the BOC and the Fed). However, U.S. BOG members talk 
to the public much more frequently via speeches and testimonies than do their Canadian 
colleagues. 
Estimated Taylor rules show that the Fed puts more weight on both inflation and 
output than does the BOC (see Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2008), who uses real-time forward-
looking Taylor rules; Collins and Siklos (2001), who calculate optimal reaction functions). It 
is likely that a more active monetary policy requires more frequent communication. Different 
monetary policy strategies can also play a role in explaining the differences in 
communication. The BOC has three monetary-policy-related goals in its current mission 
statement: low and stable inflation, a safe and secure currency, and financial stability. Its 
specific internal goal is to keep the inflation rate between 1 and 3 percent. Therefore, it has a 
rather clear inflation-targeting mandate. The Fed has to achieve the sometimes conflicting 
goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. Thus, 
the Fed does not have a clearly quantified objective and—at least officially—is more focused 
on promoting growth (while keeping inflation under control) than is the BOC. With a 8 
relatively more output-oriented target and no clearly quantified objective, the Fed has to more 
frequently communicate about its economic projections and future monetary policy. Finally, 
whereas the size of the respective committees should not play an important role as the BOG 
consists of seven members and the Canadian Governing Council has six governors, in Canada 
only speeches by the Governor are documented (except in 2006). 
Table 1 presents the frequency of the categorised news dummies. Here, we discuss 
only the top half of the table, which covers Canada, as a detailed explanation of the U.S. 
results can be found elsewhere (Hayo et al., 2008). More BOC announcements refer to the EO 
than to the MP stance. Positive economic outlooks and hawkish comments occur far more 
often than negative economic outlooks or indications of an expansionary monetary policy. 
The finding on the EO can be related to the shape of the business cycle during our sample 
period, which includes only two quarters of negative GDP growth in Canada (Q3/2001 and 
Q2/2003). A similar situation explains the small number of MP easing communications: one 
of the easing cycles is characterised by sharp rate cuts (2001; 350 bps), whereas the tightening 
cycles are rather moderate. As cheaper liquidity tends to cause few problems for market 
participants, the central bank does not have to explain as carefully a rate cut as it would a rate 
hike. 
 
Table 1: Number of nonzero values for the dummy variables 
Canada  MP Tightening MP Easing  Positive EO  Negative EO 
Post-Meeting Statement  13  3  22  16 
Monetary Policy Report  9  0  15  10 
Testimony  0  0 1 3 
Speech 14  1  31  10 
United  States       
Post-Meeting Statement  35  0  24  17 
Monetary Policy Report  6  1  15  5 
Testimony  4  2 17 3 
Speech 31  6  92  31 
 
Also included in our data set are selected macroeconomic announcements from both 
countries. We choose, from the list in Ielpo and Guégan (2009), the surprise components of 
11 U.S. news items typically watched by financial market participants: advance GDP, 
industrial production, and trade balance to capture the business cycle phase; the ISM 
manufacturing index and the Conference Board consumer confidence rating for producer and 
consumer confidence; housing starts for real estate effects; nonfarm payroll and the 9 
unemployment rate to proxy labour market conditions; retail sales for actual consumption; 
and the consumer price index and producer price index for inflation. 
Twelve types of Canadian macroeconomic announcements are taken from the lists of 
Gravelle and Moessner (2001) and Doukas and Switzer (2004): real GDP, capacity utilisation 
rate, current account, and merchandise trade balance to control for business cycle; the Ivey 
Purchasing Managers Index for producer confidence; housing starts for real estate markets; 
net change in employment and the unemployment rate to proxy labour market conditions; 
retail sales for actual consumption; and the consumer price index, industrial product price 
index, and raw materials price index for inflation. These 23 (11 for the United States; 12 for 
Canada) indicators enter the equations as 46 dummies for positive and negative news, which 
allows for an asymmetric adjustment on financial markets depending on the sign of the 
shocks.
7 
Finally, target rate changes by the Bank of Canada and the Federal Reserve Bank are 
captured by including indicator variables, separating rate hikes and cuts for each central bank, 
respectively. The coding is 1 for a 25 bps move, 2 for 50 bps, and so on. Target rate change 
surprises, which occur either after an unscheduled meeting or as an unexpected outcome of a 
meeting,
8 are captured by separate indicators. 
Our Canadian financial market indicators comprise daily closing interest rates on 
government securities, as well as daily returns on stock and foreign exchange markets over 
the period 2 January 1998 through 29 December 2006. As bond market indicators, we employ 
daily changes of three-month, six-month, and one-year Treasury bills and two-year Treasury 
notes. On stock and foreign exchange markets we examine daily returns measured as the rates 
of change of the Toronto Stock Exchange Index (TSX), the Canadian dollar/U.S. dollar 
(CAD/USD) spot rate, and the Canadian dollar/Euro (CAD/EUR) spot rate, respectively.
9 We 
choose daily data instead of intraday data for two reasons. At a conceptual level, we are 
interested in whether there are economically important effects that persist over time, instead 
of just short-term blips in the data. At a practical level, it is impossible to time the central 
bank news precisely in, say, 10-minute intervals. 
  
                                                            
7 Data source for surveys of macroeconomic announcements: Bloomberg newswire. The respective positive 
(negative) dummy variable takes the value 1 when the announcement is larger (smaller) than the survey. 
8 Bloomberg surveys are used to identify surprises from scheduled meetings. 
9 Data sources: bond and foreign exchange market series: Federal Reserves’ Statistical Releases H15 and Bank 
of Canada’s statistical database; stock market series: Datastream. Due to different holidays and different 
nontrading days for the various assets, some days are excluded. After adjusting the dataset, there are 2,170 
observations. The returns are calculated after these adjustments. 10 
4.  Econometric methodology 
Descriptive statistics show that all financial market series exhibit excess kurtosis (see Table 
A2 in the Appendix) and diagnostic testing of preliminary OLS estimations reveals significant 
ARCH effects.
10 GARCH models increase estimation efficiency by modelling this volatility 
clustering and providing explicit estimates of the parameters describing the time-varying 
nature of the conditional variance (Engle, 1982). We start with a generalised version of the 
GARCH specification as proposed by Bollerslev (1986) and apply a testing-down process to 
further increase estimation efficiency. 
 1                                       
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where α0, α1, β1, μ, , γ, δ, ζ, η, θ,  and ι are parameters or vectors of parameters and εt|Γt-1 = 
t(v); with Γt-1 capturing all information up to t-1, and t(v) a t-distribution with v degrees of 
freedom. 
The general specification of Equation (1) is an autoregressive-distributed lag model 
with six lags. The vector of control variables consists of past returns of the dependent 
variable, returns on the other Canadian markets (e.g., stock and foreign exchange market 
returns when examining the bond market), and returns of U.S. bond and stock markets. 
Contemporaneous returns on other markets and U.S. returns are excluded to avoid potential 
simultaneity problems. An impulse dummy is added on the first trading day after 11 
September 2001. The variables of interest enter the equation when they actually hit the 
market, i.e., a speech after market closure hits the market on the subsequent day. Model (1) 
allows for student-t distributed errors (Bollerslev, 1987); these provide a better approximation 
of residuals that are not normally distributed. 
After estimating these rich GARCH(1,1) models, we exclude all insignificant variables 
in a consistent general-to-specific approach (see Hendry, 1995). The extensive lag structure of 
financial control variables is intended to capture the effects of omitted variables and potential 
inefficiencies in Canadian financial markets. As in the case of communication and 
                                                            
10 For both foreign exchange market series there is only mild evidence of excess kurtosis. 11 
macroeconomic news variables, we increase estimation efficiency by applying rigorous 
exclusion tests to these controls. Diagnostic testing of the reduced models provides no 
evidence in favour of higher order GARCH(p,q) processes for all markets. Despite using 
student-t distributed errors, nonnormality appears to be present in all series and, consequently, 
we use robust standard errors as suggested by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). 
 
5.  Impact on bond market returns 
In this section, we examine the impact of news on Canadian bond market returns. Table 2a 
(for Canadian news) and 2b (for U.S. news) show the reaction of three-month, six-month, 
one-year, and two-year maturities for the entire sample.
11  
 
Table 2a: Regression estimates for bond market returns on Canadian news (full sample) 
3 Month 6 Month 1 Year  2 Year
Interest Rate Decisions 
Target Rate Hike  0.020 ** 
Target Rate Hike Surprise  0.088 **  0.096 **  0.071  **  0.104 ** 
Target Rate Ease Surprise  -0.267 **  -0.207 **        -0.098 * 
Macroeconomic News 
Real GDP -  -0.012 ** -0.017 ** -0.031  **  -0.037 **
Current Account Balance -  -0.035 ** 
Retail Sales +  0.015  *  0.017 * 
Housing Starts -  0.010 ** 
Employment Change +  0.016 **  0.027 **  0.036  **  0.046 ** 
Employment Change -       -0.030 **  -0.031  **  -0.038 ** 
Consumer Price Index +        0.020 **
Central Bank Communication 
Statement EO +  0.033  **  0.038 **
Statement EO -  -0.036 **  -0.063  **  -0.052 ** 
Monetary Policy Report EO +        0.023 **
Monetary Policy Report EO -  -0.022 **  -0.035 **  -0.047  **  -0.046 ** 
Testimony EO +  0.019 **  0.008 **  0.018  ** 
Testimony EO -  -0.031 *  -0.050  **  -0.069 ** 
Speech MP +  0.022 ** 0.036  **  0.043 **
Speech MP -  -0.010 **  -0.026 **  -0.022  **  -0.016 ** 
Speech EO -       -0.024 *  -0.037  **  -0.038 ** 
 
                                                            
11 The coefficients can be interpreted as follows. All target rate variables are coded as multiples of 25 bps. For 
example, the coefficient 0.089 implies an increase of 8.9 bps after a 25 bps surprise hike in the Canadian target 
rate. All macroeconomic variables enter the equation as news dummies (the actual announcement is higher than 
the survey). For example, a coefficient of -0.011 represents a decrease of 1.1 bps after negative (worse than 
expected) GDP news. In case of central bank communication, a coefficient of -0.036 denotes a decrease of 3.6 
bps after a negative economic outlook in a statement. 12 
Table 2b: Regression estimates for bond market returns on U.S. news (full sample) 
Interest Rate Decisions 
Target Rate Ease  -0.015 ** -0.028  ** 
Target Rate Ease Surprise  -0.046 **  -0.057 **  -0.035  **      
Macroeconomic News 
Advance GDP -  0.016 ** 
Consumer Confidence +  0.014 **  0.020  **  0.024 ** 
Manufacturing Index +  0.024 ** 
Manufacturing Index -  -0.020 ** 
Retail  Sales  +  0.007 ** 0.012 ** 0.019  ** 0.023 ** 
Housing Starts -  -0.016 * 
Nonfarm  Payroll  -  -0.017 ** -0.028 ** -0.044  ** -0.050 ** 
Unemployment Rate +  0.010 **  0.018 **  0.026  *  0.038 ** 
Central Bank Communication 
Statement EO -  -0.020 **       -0.041 *
Monetary Policy Report MP -  0.061 ** 0.092 ** 0.110  **  0.079 *
Monetary Policy Report EO -  -0.017 **  -0.045 **  -0.078  **  -0.066 * 
Testimony MP +        -0.039 *
Testimony MP -  0.015 **                 
Speech EO +  -0.004 *                 
Speech EO -            0.014  **  0.022 ** 
Notes: * (**) indicates significance at a 5 percent (1 percent) level. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-
consistent. Only the variables of interest of the reduced model resulting from the testing-down process (Chi
2(99) 
= 112.8; Chi
2(95) = 113.2; Chi
2(92) = 113.6; Chi
2(87) = 80.7, respectively) are listed. Full tables are available 
upon request. EO = Economic Outlook and MP = Monetary Policy. 
 
Shocks in either of the U.S. price indicators (CPI and PPI) do not explain Canadian 
bond returns. Thus, our results suggest that financial market participants believe that Canada 
is fully insulated from U.S. price shocks by the flexible exchange rate. This finding somewhat 
contradicts previous literature, which found CPI and PPI news to be significant. Unanticipated 
rate hikes and, even more strongly, unanticipated rate cuts
12 by the BOC have the largest 
economic impact across all maturities. U.S. MP easing surprises also have a negative 
influence up to a one-year maturity, but the size of this effect is significantly smaller than for 
surprising Canadian rate cuts.
13 
The most relevant Canadian macro news is negative GDP shocks and both types of 
movements in net employment, which are significant across all maturities. Positive U.S. 
consumption news (measured by actual retail sales and consumer confidence) and U.S. labour 
market conditions (measured by negative nonfarm payroll and positive unemployment rate 
shocks) also play an important role in explaining bond yields. 
                                                            
12 Chi²(1) = 1691** (3 month), Chi²(1) = 51.1** (6 month). 
13 Chi²(1) = 1226** (3 month), Chi²(1) = 101** (6 month). 13 
Concerning the communication variables, the estimations reveal a greater number of 
significant Canadian variables. Moreover, some U.S. communication variables have 
unexpected signs, whereas all Canadian variables have the expected sign (this holds for target 
rate changes and macro news, too). Again, the coefficient sizes are roughly equal across both 
countries. Canadian monetary policy news only matters when it is communicated in its least 
formalised category, namely, speeches. All other forms (post-meeting statements, monetary 
policy reports, and testimony) move markets only when they contain news about the 
economic outlook. In only one case do we find statistical evidence for an asymmetric reaction 
to good and bad news: two-year bonds react significantly more strongly to positive MP news 
than to negative MP news.
14 
Hayo et al. (2008) conclude that in the United States, the impact of communication 
tends to increase with its degree of formality. For Canadian bond markets, we find some 
evidence of this same phenomenon based on point estimates (particularly for all types of 
Canadian negative EO news), but these differences are not statistically significant . We also 
detect that the impact of news generally tends to increase with maturity. The only exception is 
the reaction to unexpected Canadian rate cuts which is more indicative of a timing surprise 
than of a reversion in future monetary policy (cf. Kearns and Manners, 2006). Statistical 
testing generally supports these conclusions.
15 
In terms of financial market impact, the coefficient estimates presented above could be 
slightly misleading, in as much as some types of news typically occur more often than others. 
Therefore, we compare the impact of interest rate changes, macroeconomic news, and central 
bank communication by taking into account the frequency of news. Table 3 shows the 10 
variables that exert the largest cumulative absolute effects on each maturity over the whole 
sample. 
When taking into account the frequency of news, labour market announcements from 
both countries (Canadian employment change, U.S. nonfarm payroll, U.S. unemployment 
rate) turn out to be the most important drivers of Canadian bond returns. For example, 
negative U.S. nonfarm payroll news drives the two-year returns down by 2.93 percentage 
                                                            
14 Chi²(1) = 6.6**. 
15 Canadian Testimony EO–: 6m vs. 2y: z = 2*. 
Canadian Rate Cut Surprise: 3m vs. 6m: z = -4.2**; 3m vs. 2y: z = -3.5**; 6m vs. 2y: z = -2.2*. 
Canadian GDP–: 3m vs. 1y: z = 2.5*; 3m vs. 2y: z = 2.9**; 6m vs. 2y: z = 2.2*. 
U.S. Target Rate Cut: 3m vs. 1y: z = 2.2*. 
U.S. Nonfarm Payroll–: 3m vs. 1y: z = 2.2*; 3m vs. 2y: z = 2.8**. 
U.S. Unemployment Rate+: 3m vs. 2y: -2.3*. 
U.S. Monetary Policy Report EO–: 3m vs. 6m: z = 2.3*; 3m vs. 1y: z = 2.5*. 14 
points over the whole sample. This is a new finding as prior studies always highlight a broad 
set of important variables from several categories of macroeconomic news. 
 
Table 3: Top-10 cumulative returns for bond markets 
3 Month 6 Month 1 Year  2 Year
Canadian News
Interest Rate Decisions 
Target Rate Hike  0.50   
Target Rate Ease Surprise  -0.80  -0.62       
Macroeconomic News 
Real GDP -  -0.37 -0.53 -1.00  -1.19
Employment Change +  0.72  1.21  1.61  2.07 
Employment Change -     -0.82  -0.83  -1.02 
Central Bank Communication 
Statement EO -  -0.57 -1.02  -0.83
Statement EO +        0.72  0.83 
Monetary Policy Report EO -  -0.22          
U.S. News 
Interest Rate Decisions 
Target Rate Ease  -0.37 -0.70 
Target Rate Ease Surprise  -0.42  -0.52       
Macroeconomic News 
Consumer Confidence +  0.76 1.06  1.29
Manufacturing Index -  -1.07 
Retail Sales +  0.29  0.75  0.92 
Nonfarm  Payroll  -  -0.99 -1.60 -2.55 -2.93 
Unemployment Rate +  0.43  0.82  1.15  1.72 
Central Bank Communication 
Speech EO +  -0.38          
Note: The figures are calculated by taking the estimates from Table 2, which are then multiplied by the 
respective frequency of news. For each maturity, the 10 types of news exerting the largest impact are shown. EO 
= Economic Outlook and MP = Monetary Policy. 
 
In general, macroeconomic news plays a larger role in terms of size than central bank 
communication and target rate changes. Concerning the origin, U.S. macroeconomic news is 
more important than Canadian. The opposite is found for interest rate changes (at least for the 
magnitude of the effects) where Canadian news is predominant. In the case of central bank 
communication, U.S. variables do not play a remarkable role as only speeches enter the top 10 
in one case, while Canadian variables show up eight times.  15 
In a next step, we check whether our findings are driven by particular subsamples. 
Gravelle and Moessner (2001) conclude that prior to the introduction of fixed announcement 
dates, market participants paid more attention to U.S. macroeconomic news than they did to 
the same type of Canadian news. Our results indicate that news from both countries has 
approximately the same impact over the full sample period, which contradicts Parent (2003), 
who finds that Canadian news has a much stronger impact after the introduction of FADs. 
We use the day the BOC announced the introduction of the FAD system (19 
September 2000) as a first break point. We also pay special attention to the period during 
which Canadian interest rates were markedly different than U.S. rates. The BOC’s target rate 
hike on 16 April 2002 hit the market as a surprise (according to the Bloomberg survey) and 
therefore we use this date as the beginning of a monetary policy phase. This period ended on 
8 September 2004 when the BOC became more closely aligned with the Fed’s tightening 
cycle. The four subsamples are defined in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Different phases of Canadian monetary policy 
  Start Date  End Date  Description 
I  02/01/1998  18/09/2000  No FAD, following U.S. MP course officially announced 
II  19/09/2000  15/04/2002  FAD, following U.S. MP course 
III  16/04/2002 07/09/2004  FAD,  departing from U.S. MP course  
IV  08/09/2004  29/12/2006  FAD, following U.S. MP course 
Notes: MP = Monetary Policy and FAD = Fixed Announcement Dates. 
 
We examine these subsamples for all markets using Equation (1) (without GARCH 
features) applying OLS, as we do not find significant ARCH effects in subsamples II–IV. 
Again, we reduce the model size following the general-to-specific approach. For this purpose, 
we rely on the Autometrics algorithm described in Doornik (2008). Table 5 contains a 
summary of the results for the four subsamples for the three-month and two-year maturities.
16 
To simplify the presentation, we counted the number of significant coefficients and allocated 
them to different categories of the variables: target rate changes, real macro news, housing 
and price news, MP communications, and EO communications. The frequency of unexpected 
signs is given in parentheses. 
In the last two periods, we find more Canadian news with expected signs across all 
maturities. The impact of U.S. news is largest before and shortly after FADs were introduced, 
both in absolute terms and in relation to Canadian news. Thus, Canadian market participants 
                                                            
16 Results for six-month and one-year maturities are omitted to conserve space but are available on request. 16 
did not put more weight on Canadian news immediately after the introduction of FADs. 
Instead, Canadian news becomes more important (when looking at correct signs) in Period III, 
when the BOC target rate actually moved away from the Federal Funds target rate. In Period 
IV, during which the BOC became more closely aligned with the Fed’s tightening cycle, the 
impact of Canadian news is still larger than the impact of U.S. news. 
 
Table 5: Regression estimates for bond market returns (subsamples from Table 2) 
   3 Month  2 Year 
Canadian  News  I II  III  IV I II  III  IV 
Target Rate Change Variables  1  1  2  1  1          
Real  Macro  News  1  (1)  1 3 3  4  (2)  2 3 6 
Housing and Price News  2 (1)  3 (1)  2  1  2          
Communication MP  1 (1)  1  1  1 
Communication  EO  3  (1)  2 3 2  4  (2)  3 3 4 
Sum  8 (4)  7 (1)  11  8  11 (4) 5  7  10 
                          
U.S.  News  I II  III  IV I II  III  IV 
Target Rate Change Variables  1  2  2 (1)        1       
Real  Macro  News  2  (1)  2 3 3  4  (1)  3 3 3 
Housing and Price News     3 (1)     1  1 (1)  1       
Communication MP  2 (1)  1 (1)     3 (1) 
Communication EO  1  1 (1)  1 (1)  2 (1)  1  1  1 (1)    
Sum  6 (2)  9 (3)  6 (2)  6 (1)  9 (3)  6  4 (1)  3 
Notes: The figures denote the number of variables significant at the 5 percent level after the testing-down 
process. In parentheses is the number of unexpected signs. EO = Economic Outlook and MP = Monetary Policy. 
 
Some trends are evident in several categories. The impact of target rate changes in 
Canada declines over time. Arguably, the BOC becomes more predictable in Period IV. 
Canadian real macro news, in turn, seems to drive the overall results as its impact is clearly 
ascending (cf. Parent, 2003). The impact of communication is roughly the same over time, 
with EO announcements dominating MP inclinations. The existence of an inflation target 
(starting in 1991) may explain why there are so few monetary surprises and we find no 
evidence that introducing FADs significantly increases the transparency of BOC 
communication. 
Turning to U.S. news, Canadian bonds have become less sensitive to target rate 
movements over time, suggesting that the Fed’s predictability improved. The impact of Fed 
communication and, in particular, MP news, declines over time, another indication that U.S. 
news matters less. The same applies to housing and price news. In contrast, news on real U.S. 17 
macro indicators exerts roughly the same influence over the full sample period, reflective of 
the fact that the United States remains Canada’s most important trading partner. This finding 
can be interpreted as supporting Gravelle and Moessner’s (2001) argument that the lack of 
FADs is responsible for the relative unimportance of Canadian news. However, we find that 
the markets’ focus toward Canadian news emerges only after a sustained period of deviation 
from the U.S. interest rate path. Therefore, it is unclear whether the reform of monetary 
announcements, the noteworthy deviation from U.S. interest rate paths, or a combination of 
both factors strengthens the importance of Canadian news. 
 
6.  Further evidence from foreign exchange and stock markets 
We now assess the foreign exchange market in more detail using both the CAD/USD and the 
CAD/EUR exchange rates. Table 6a (for Canadian news) and 6b (for U.S. news) summarises 
the impact of news on these markets.
 We expect that good U.S. news will depreciate the 
CAD/USD exchange rate; however, due to tight trade relations and financial integration, good 
U.S. news is expected to appreciate the CAD/EUR spot rate.  
 
Table 6a: Regression estimates for the foreign exchange market returns
17 on Canadian news 
   CAD/USD CAD/EUR
Interest Rate Decisions 
Target Rate Hike  0.267 **         
Target Rate Hike Surprise  -0.426 ** 
Target Rate Ease          -0.216 * 
Macroeconomic News 
Current Account Balance +  -0.290 *  
Retail Sales +  -0.173 * 
Employment +  -0.232 ** 
Employment -  0.537 ** 
Unemployment Rate -  0.215 ** 
Consumer Price Index -  0.130 *  
Central Bank Communication 
Statement MP -  -0.496 ** 0.617 **
Statement EO +  -0.221 * 
Testimony EO +  0.201 ** -0.848 **
Testimony EO -  -0.271 **         
Speech MP -  -0.552 ** 
Speech EO +  -0.203 * 
Speech EO -  -0.196 *         
 
                                                            
17 Note that the foreign exchange rate series is in price notation, so a negative sign implies an appreciation. 18 
Table 6b: Regression estimates for the foreign exchange market returns on U.S. news 
Interest Rate Decisions 
Target Rate Hike  -0.211 *  
Target Rate Hike Surprise  0.203 ** 
Target Rate Ease Surprise  0.166 **     0.367 ** 
Macroeconomic News 
Industrial Production - 0.123 * 0.234 *
Non-farm Payroll +  -0.619 ** 
Unemployment Rate -          0.482 ** 
Central Bank Communication 
Statement EO -  -0.240 **         
Monetary Policy Report MP -  0.554 ** 1.155 **
Testimony EO -  -0.497 *
Notes: * (**) indicates significance at a 5 percent (1 percent) level. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-
consistent. Only the variables of interest of the reduced model resulting from the testing-down process (Chi
2(96) 
= 119.2; Chi
2(103) = 102.8, respectively) are listed. Full tables are available upon request. EO = Economic 
Outlook and MP = Monetary Policy. 
 
News originating from both countries has an impact on both markets. The reaction of the U.S. 
dollar exchange rate is dominated by a higher frequency of Canadian compared to U.S. 
shocks. 
An unexpected depreciation against the U.S. dollar after Canadian target rate hikes is 
offset by an appreciation after rate surprises, with the sum of the two opposite effects being 
statistically insignificant.
18A similar situation occurs regarding U.S. target rate hikes and the 
U.S. dollar exchange rate: appreciation after a hike is offset by the surprise component and 
statistically insignificant.
19 Also unexpected is the appreciation against the euro after rate cuts. 
Thus, target rate changes have neither a clear-cut impact on the CAD/USD nor on the 
CAD/EUR exchange rates. 
In contrast, all macroeconomic news variables from both countries have the expected 
sign. Positive (negative) real Canadian macroeconomic variables appreciate (depreciate) both 
exchange rates. As to U.S. news, positive retail sales news has a depressing impact on the 
dollar exchange rate (positive U.S. news is automatically bad news for the exchange rate), 
whereas positive (negative) news appreciates (depreciates) the euro exchange rate via spill-
over effects. 
BOC communication variables have puzzling coefficients for the CAD/USD spot rate, 
but the ones for the CAD/EUR spot rate conform to our expectations. A possible explanation 
                                                            
18 Chi²(1) = 2.3. 
19 Chi²(1) = 0.01. 19 
is that good (bad) news triggers higher (lowers) imports from the United States, thereby 
depreciating (appreciating) the exchange rate. U.S. communication shows the expected signs 
on the U.S. dollar exchange rate, while the euro rate is not much affected. Finally, robustness 
tests show that omitting the first nine months of 1998, which are characterised by 
interventions in the foreign exchange market, does not change the results. 
Table 7 presents evidence that news from both countries also matters for the Canadian 
stock market, as measured by the TSX index. Target rate changes have an impact only when 
they are issued by the Fed and surprise the markets with unexpectedly loose monetary policy. 
Canadian macro news does not matter for the index, apart from a surprisingly positive 
reaction to bad GDP news. Five different categories of U.S. macro news are significant in 
explaining stock returns, for instance, a higher than expected consumer price index (indicating 
future rate hikes by the Fed) and a negative U.S. trade balance depress returns. 
 
Table 7: Regression estimates for stock market returns 
Canada U.S. 
Interest Rate Decisions 
   Target Rate Ease Surprise  1.901 **
Macroeconomic News 
GDP -  0.285 * Trade Balance - -0.239 *
Manufacturing Index +  0.560 **
Manufacturing Index -  0.361 **
Nonfarm Payroll -  0.180 * 
   Consumer Price Index + -0.333 *
  
Central Bank Communication 
Monetary Policy Report EO -  -0.829 **
Testimony EO +  2.242 ** Testimony EO +  0.332 * 
        Testimony EO -  -1.392 * 
Speech EO -  -0.690 **
Notes: * (**) indicates significance at a 5 percent (1 percent) level. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-
consistent. Only the variables of interest of the reduced model resulting from the testing-down process 
(Chi
2(103) = 127.3) are listed. Full tables are available upon request. EO = Economic Outlook and MP = 
Monetary Policy. 
 
In both countries, central bank communication indicating a change in monetary policy 
has no influence on the stock market; only EO announcements matter. Positive Canadian 
testimony exerts a significantly larger impact than negative monetary policy reports and 20 
negative news in speeches.
20 Finally, positive Canadian testimony moves the markets more 
than positive U.S. testimony.
21 
 
7.  Impact on market volatility 
In this section, we study the impact of our news variables on financial market volatility. The 
specification of Equation (1) is too demanding for analysing the effects of news variables on 
the conditional variance. The large number of dummy variables in the models prevents 
convergence in the estimation procedures (see Doornik and Ooms, 2008). Therefore, we 
simplify the specifications, as shown in Equation (2): 
 2                             
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where the parameters are defined as above. Some of the control variables used in Equation (1) 
are omitted as we only include lags of the dependent variables. From our variables of interest, 
we include only target rate movements by both central banks in the mean equation. We run 
two sets of regressions for each of the financial market series. (i) We include four dummy 
variables in the conditional variance equation distinguishing between good and bad news 
originating from the United States and Canada. (ii) We differentiate between target rate 
changes, macro news, and communication events in the United States and Canada, resulting 
in six dummies. After estimating these models, we exclude all insignificant variables using a 
general-to-specific approach. In Tables 8a–8c we report on only those markets significantly 
affected by news in the conditional variance equation. 
Table 8a shows the impact of good and bad news in each country. Only the stock 
market is affected; positive news from Canada reduces uncertainty and thereby lowers price 
volatility. More significant coefficients are revealed when differentiating between target rate 
changes, macro news, and communication events for each country (see Table 8b). On the one 
hand, market participants increase trading activity when the BOC or the Fed changes its target 
rate. On the other hand, Canadian communication and macro news lower price volatility.
22 
                                                            
20 Chi²(1) = 69**, Chi²(1) = 46**. 
21 Chi²(1) = 137**. 
22 In the three-month regression, the absolute effects of rate changes dominate those of macro news (Chi²(1) = 
14.1**). Statistical testing shows that the impact of BOC rate changes on the FX market is significantly smaller 
than it is across all bond maturities (CAD/EUR vs. 3m: z = 4.6**; vs. 6m: z = 2.4*; vs. 1y: z = 2.54*). Based on 
point estimates, we find that volatility increases with ascending maturity. 21 
This is consistent with Hayo et al. (2008), who conclude that Fed communications have a 
calming effect on financial markets. 
 
Table 8a: Conditional variance dependent on positive and negative news  
   TSX 
CDN Positive News  -0.000005* 
 
Table 8b: Conditional variance dependent on different types of news 
   CAD/EUR  3 Month  6 Month  1 Year  2 Year 
CDN Rate Change  0.00001**  0.000314**  0.000591*  0.000881*   
CDN Comm.  -0.000006**      
CDN Macro     -0.000065**    
U.S. Rate Change    0.00023**     
U.S. Macro         0.000271** 
 
Table 8c: Conditional variance dependent on rate change surprises and nonsurprises 
   CAD/EUR  3 Month  6 Month  1 Year  2 Year 
CDN Surprise     0.003327* 0.004868* 0.004692** 
CDN Nonsurprise  0.000009**      
Notes: * (**) indicates significance at a 5 percent (1 percent) level. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-
consistent. Only the variables of interest of the reduced model resulting from the testing-down process are listed. 
Full tables are available upon request. 
 
Table 8c shows the influence of Canadian target rate surprises and nonsurprises on the 
volatility of financial markets. The results for the longer maturities suggest that unexpected 
changes lead to more volatility as the coefficients here are larger than the ones in Table 8b. 
 
8.  Further specifications and robustness checks 
This section explores the robustness of our findings. First, we apply several different 
specifications to the macroeconomic news dummies. We test whether the actual values and 
the standardised shocks have an impact on our financial market indicators. Only the shocks 
turn out to be significant, thereby confirming the efficient market hypothesis. The same 
outcome occurs when including actual values and news dummies instead of shocks. Thus, it is 
only the news component of macroeconomic announcements that matters to market 
participants. We also discover that the results using news dummies statistically dominate the 
ones using standardised shocks and, therefore, we employ news dummies as in the analysis 
presented above. 22 
Second, we include additional communication variables in the model. Variables 
containing information from speeches given by the 12 regional Fed presidents, who are also 
members of the FOMC, are inserted into Equation (1). In one set of regressions, we check for 
the impact of this group as a whole; in another we split the group into voting presidents and 
nonvoting presidents. Neither specification reveals anything of note, so we retain our more 
parsimonious design. 
Third, we systematically split the sample at different dates. We consider two 
alternatives for the break point between Periods I and II: (1) the day the schedule of FADs 
was published (30 October 2000) and (2) the first FAD itself (5 December 2000). The break 
point between Periods II and III is less ambiguous, as the target rate hike by the BOC is a 
surprise, at least according to Bloomberg. We also conduct regressions with 20 July 2004 as a 
break point between Periods III and IV, as it was on this day that the BOC indicated a 
possible rate hike in the near future for the first time since 2002. These various specifications 
did not reveal big differences and we feel confirmed in our choice of subsamples. The results 
presented above are based on the most reliable statistical models and the corresponding set of 
splitting dates generates subsamples with similar numbers of observations in each. In a 
different approach, we apply impulse and step dummies to a pooled data set to capture the 
periods of different market activities instead of splitting the data set into four subsamples. It 
turns out to be impossible to robustly estimate Equation (1) within such an encompassing 
framework. 
Fourth, we try several specifications to deal with unexpected signs for FOMC 
communication variables emerging in the bond markets. Hayo et al. (2008) conclude that not 
all FOMC communication is of particular interest to financial market agents. Therefore, we 
alternatively use the indicators constructed by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007), which are 
based on Reuter newswire reports. These regressions reveal fewer significant coefficients and 
also contain unexpected signs. In addition, employing this set of data would shorten our 
sample period and we could not utilise the broader base of news used in our examination 
above. Therefore, we decided to remain with the approach presented above. 
Fifth, we control for volatility spillovers from U.S. to Canadian financial markets. For 
this purpose, we rely on the conditional volatility estimates in Hayo et al. (2008) and include 
these in the volatility equations of models (1) and (2). As none of the Canadian markets is 
significantly affected by U.S. volatility, we retain our more parsimonious approach. 
Sixth, we extend Equation (1) by some additional GARCH features. The variance 
enters the main equation (Engle et al., 1987) and asymmetric effects of nonmodelled shocks 23 
(Engle and Ng, 1993) as well as asymmetry thresholds (Glosten et al., 1993) are captured in 
the variance equation. These additional features do not change the results, so for simplicity we 
rely on our baseline GARCH specification. Finally, we explore anticipation and persistence or 
reversion effects by including one-period lead and lagged Canadian and U.S. target rate 
changes, macroeconomic news, and communication variables. For the most part, this 




In this paper, we study the effects of all types of BOC and FOMC communication, as well as 
Canadian and U.S. macroeconomic news, on bond, stock, and foreign exchange market 
returns and volatility in Canada. Econometrically, we employ a rich GARCH specification of 
daily financial returns to capture the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity that 
characterises many financial series. We address the following four research questions. 
First,  does U.S. and Canadian central bank communication (including target rate 
changes) and macroeconomic news have an impact on Canadian financial market returns? 
Central bank communication and macro news from both countries have an impact on all 
financial markets. This is a new finding, as (1) the impact of U.S. and Canadian central bank 
communication on Canadian financial markets is neglected in the literature and (2) previous 
studies (e.g., Gravelle and Moessner, 2001) address only a limited subset of the news 
variables included in this survey. Analysing different categories of news reveals that target 
rate changes in both countries matter, particularly when they come as a surprise to the 
markets. Canadian price shocks do not play a role when looking at the whole sample. The 
same applies (to a somewhat lesser extent) to monetary policy inclinations communicated by 
both central banks, whereas economic outlook announcements draw more reaction. Perhaps 
the inflation targeting regime introduced in 1991 leaves little room for policy surprises. When 
taking into account the frequency of the announcements, macroeconomic news dominates 
interest rate decisions and central bank communication. In particular, labour market news 
from both countries is the most important news category. 
Second, which type of news, U.S. or Canadian, is relatively more relevant? Canadian 
communication is more relevant than its U.S. counterpart, particularly for bond markets, 
where U.S. variables are rarely significant with an expected sign. Target rate changes in both 
countries are of similar relevance. U.S. macro news is particularly relevant to the bond and 24 
stock markets, arguably reflecting the large degree of real economic integration between the 
two countries. 
Third, does the introduction of the FAD system change agents’ sensitivity to Canadian 
news? In particular, is there a larger reaction to Canadian news in the April 2002 to 
September 2004 subsample, a period during which the course of BOC monetary policy was 
different from that of the Fed, compared to reactions in other periods? To address this 
question, we assess the bond market in more detail and split the sample into four subsamples. 
We find evidence that the greatest impact of U.S. news occurs well after the FAD system was 
introduced. This suggests that the reform in monetary announcements had only a limited 
effect on financial markets’ perceptions of Canadian monetary policy. Instead, Canadian news 
becomes more important during the period when the BOC target rate deviated from the 
Federal Funds target rate. However, in Period IV, during which the BOC became more 
closely aligned with the Fed’s tightening cycle, the impact is still larger than in earlier 
periods. To some extent, this finding supports a claim by Gravelle and Moessner (2001), who 
blame the lack of FADs for the relative unimportance of Canadian news. However, the 
enlarged focus toward Canadian news emerges only after a period of noteworthy deviations 
from U.S. interest rate paths. So, it is unclear whether the reform of monetary announcements, 
the strong deviation from U.S. interest rate paths, or a combination of both factors strengthens 
the importance of Canadian news. 
Finally,  does U.S. and Canadian news exert an influence on financial market 
volatility? Canadian financial market volatility is positively affected by those Canadian target 
rate changes that hit the markets as a surprise. U.S. rate changes and Canadian nonsurprises 
also lead to increased price volatility, whereas all other types of Canadian variables lower 
price volatility. 25 
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Appendix 
Figure A1: Federal Funds Target Rate vs. Bank of Canada Target Rate 
 
 
Table A1: Federal Reserve Bank vs. Bank of Canada 
  Federal Reserve Bank  Bank of Canada 
Accountability 
Quantitative inflation 
objectives   no  point target 
with tolerance interval 




    
Policy decisions 
Decisions announced 
immediately  yes yes 
Press conferences  no  no 
Press releases   yes  yes 
Minutes published  yes (five- to eight-week lag)  no 
Voting result published  yes  no 
    
Economic assessments 
Reports on monetary policy  semi-annual*  quarterly 
Forecasts released   semi-annual  quarterly 
Quantitative risk assessments   no  no 
    
Forecast 




Frequency   semi-annual  quarterly 
Time horizon   12–18 months  18–24 months 
Presentation   range  point 
Policy assumption  no change  endogenous 
*Beige book: eight times a year. 






1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
U.S. Target Rate Canadian Target Rate28 
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of Financial Market Returns 
   Mean  Std. Dev. Skewness  Exc. Kurtosis Minimum  Maximum 
3 Month  0 0.0367  4.79  145.59  -0.43  0.85 
6 Month  -0.0001 0.0413  1.47  42.07  -0.42  0.68 
1 Year  -0.0003 0.0497  0.2698  9.8  -0.38  0.53 
2 Year  -0.0003 0.0589  0.4883  6.54  -0.4  0.53 
CAD/USD  -0.0001 0.0044  0.0283  0.9917  -0.0176  0.0182 
CAD/EUR  -0.00001 0.0065  0.2303  1.27  -0.0272  0.0303 
TSX  0.0003 0.0107 -0.7142  6.26  -0.0963  0.0468 
Number of observations: 2,163 